The official DTI proposals themselves.
Links to all the known responses to the DTI paper which are online. Comments came from the Law Society, BT, Intel, Hewlett Packard and many many more.
The OECD guidelines which the DTI document is attempting to conform to. The language of the guidelines is quite strong (and very sensible) in places about what is acceptable. This is unusual for documents from this organization. However it does leave the tradeoff between state monitoring and private privacy to be made by each individual country.
A discussion of the real meaning of the OECD document, written by Stewart Baker, a participant in the creation process.
A paper by acknowledged experts (Hal Abelson, Ross Anderson, Steven M. Bellovin, Josh Benaloh, Matt Blaze, Whitfield Diffie, John Gilmore, Peter G. Neumann, Ronald L. Rivest, Jeffery I. Schiller, Bruce Schneier). They warn of new security risks and the vast costs which will be associated with "key escrow" or "key recovery" schemes. They don't comment upon the merits of "law enforcement"s requirement for "key escrow". They do show that it will neither be easy to satisfy, nor in the least bit cheap.
The Labour Party 'Official Line'.
"Attempts to control the use of encryption technology are wrong in principle, unworkable in practice, and damaging to the long-term economic value of the information networks." The Labour Party do not seem to be in favour of compulsory key escrow, but do favour an approach involving extending search warrants to access to encrypted material.
A survey of crypto controls in various different countries. It turns out that, contrary to popular belief, very few have any controls at all.
A non-profit civil liberties organisation, active in the crypto debate.
Peter Guttman's extensive list of links to related material. Note that the link is to a UK mirror; besides being bandwidth friendly, the original site in New Zealand was badly affected by the Auckland power crisis.
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